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ESSAY

REVERSE ENGINEERING OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS1

Bethany K Dumas*
Reverse engineering of jury instructions requires (1)
creating a decision structure or decision tree for a case,
based on a theory of the case, (2) identifying crucial points
in the decision structure or decision tree, and (3)
incorporating crucial points into the jury instructions. This
paper suggests that reverse engineering of jury instructions
can be used to instruct jurors about legal concepts and
technical terms before they hear jury instructions or closing
arguments.
The goal is to improve the clarity of
instructions to achieve litigation goals.
It is a truism in the legal community that successful
advocacy in the courtroom requires a lawyer to proceed
based on an appropriate theory of the case.2 Through a
theory of the case, the lawyer organizes and correlates facts3
to support the most effective legal argument for the client.
Further, evidence presented to jurors in a jury trial must
fully support that theory of the case or explain why a
competing theory is inadequate to explain the facts of the
case. Thus "[t]he modem litigator's arsenal should include
...techniques ... for selecting appropriate case theories,
for testing those theories, and then for making the theories
This is a draft of Chapter 4 of a book manuscript in progress, Writing
and Using Effective Jury Instructions. Earlier chapters are: 1. Jury
Instructions: History and Rationale, 2. Lay Perceptions of Jury Service,
and 3. Recent Criticism and Reform Efforts.
* Professor of English, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN. B.A.
Lamar University; M.A. & Ph.D., University of Arkansas; J.D.
University of Tennessee.
2

See JAMES W. McELHANEY, EFFECTIVE LITIGATION:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 123 (1974).
3 See Id; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1517 (8th ed. 2004).
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understood at both an intellectual level and a psychological
level through4 the use of illustrative exhibits or computer
technology."
In jury trials, the litigator's arsenal must also
include techniques for insuring that jurors are adequately
instructed with respect to their decision-making
responsibilities. In most jurisdictions, it is still assumed
that adequate instruction includes instruction in law, though
two states, Kentucky and perhaps5 Georgia, seem to be
moving away from that assumption.
Let me pause to explain what is being called the
"Kentucky Approach" to jury instructions, as it has
implications for the material below. Attorney Charles M.
Cork, III, of Macon, Georgia, contrasts it with current
practice thus:
Much of current practice conceives jury
instruction as a miniature, accelerated education
process in which the judge lectures on one or more
fields of law and the jurors are expected to
assimilate the lecture into a coherent and correct
understanding of the law. This will be called the
"Lecture Approach." The goal of this process is
that the jurors will understand all of the contours
of legal doctrine reflecting on the legal dispute
before them. The lawyers for each party will
supply to the judge a series of proposed jury
instructions comprised of excerpts from reported
decisions or statutory text, selected in a partisan
manner, emphasizing language that is most
favorable to the client's case, and often repeating
Anthony J. Bocchino & Samuel H. Solomon, What Juries Want to
Hear: Methods for Developing Persuasive Case Theory, 67 TENN. L.
REV. 543, 543 (2000).
' Charles M. Cork, III, A Better Orientationfor Jury Instructions, 54
MERCER L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2002).
4

2
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such language in different ways. The current rules
for presenting instructions and obtaining review of
the judge's decisions give no incentive to lawyers
to submit balanced and simple, but complete, jury
instructions.
After
receiving
opposing,
unbalanced sets of proposed instructions from the
lawyers, the judge will then attempt to assemble
the excerpts into a cohesive, neutral body of text
that will educate the jury about all relevant aspects
of the law applicable to any issue raised by the
evidence and the contentions of the parties.
Unfortunately, the instructions proposed by
counsel will hamper, not assist, the judge's efforts
to instruct the jury.
Unless the judge can
accomplish a creative synthesis of the proposed
instructions, or ignores them, the jury will hear a
number of excerpts that apparently conflict with
each other. Further, the excerpts often contain
misleading legal usage of common terms, legal
jargon, and other confusing and misleading
instructions. The result is that the jury instructions
will fail to enable jurors to understand the
contours of the applicable law simply because
those contours cannot be learned by ordinary
citizens through cramming; the law can only be
learned by legal study that systematizes and
harmonizes the body of relevant legal texts into a
coherent whole. What is sensible to judges and
lawyers, who have had years to learn the contours
of the law, will remain opaque to jurors without
6
similar training and experience.

The process whereby judges attempt to assemble
lawyers' suggestions into a cohesive document sometimes
6 Id. at

2 (internal citation omitted).
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includes a charge or charging conference, a meeting during
which the parties' attorneys present their suggestions for
jury instructions.7 The goal of the charge or charging
conference is for decisions to be made so that shortly after
the meeting the parties' attorneys receive copies of the jury
instructions that will be use. The judge makes all final
decisions. Now let us contrast current practice with what is
being done in Kentucky and which Georgia appears to be
moving towards; Cork continues thus:
Instead of treating jury instruction as a
compulsory mini-law school, it is far superior to
orient jury instruction practice so that it helps the
jury do its job, which is to resolve questions of
fact.

The method

.

.

.

already practiced in

Kentucky and toward which the Georgia Supreme
Court may be moving, is to limit instructions to
the core factual issues that control the ultimate
verdict. This method will be called the "Kentucky
Approach." The judge gives instructions in order
to call for the jury to do something, rather than to
contribute to the jurors' knowledge of somewhat
random information about the law. Instructions
are framed around the parties' respective burdens
of proof and their contentions.
Typically, a
complete instruction on liability in a simple tort
case would take the form of, "D had a duty to do
x, y, and z; if you believe from the evidence that D
failed to comply with any of these duties and that
the failure to comply was a substantial factor in
causing P's injuries, you should find for P;
otherwise, you should find for D." Instructions in
cases with legal issues of greater complexity will
still be framed in terms of the factual issues that
the jury must resolve in order to determine
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (8'

ed. 2004).
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whether a party with the burden of proof has
sustained that burden. . . . The point of these
instructions is to call upon the jury to perform its
fact-finding function, rather than the essentially
legal 8 function of harmonizing disparate legal
texts.
More generally, perhaps, such an issue as burden of
proof is crucial in all cases, and such issues as contributory
responsibility are important in some cases. In any event,
jurors must be persuaded by factual evidence, and that is
most effectively accomplished in terms of a theory of the
case-defined very comprehensively in Black's Law
Dictionary:
A comprehensive and orderly mental arrangement
of principles and facts, conceived and constructed
for the purpose of securing a judgment or decree
of a court in favor of a litigant; the particular line
of reasoning of either party to a suit, the purpose
being to bring together certain facts of the case in
a logical sequence and to correlate them in a way
that produces in the decision-maker's mind a
definite 9result or conclusion favored by the
advocate.
The remainder of this article will identify briefly
some contemporary commentary on the ways in which case
theories are developed and implemented in decision
structures or decision trees (hereafter "decision
structures"), then address the issue of how litigators can
insure that jury instructions are adequate to allow jurors to
consider a given case theory fairly.

8

Id. at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).

9 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (8th ed. 2004).
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The technique discussed in this paper is known as
reverse engineering of jury instructions. The term was
initially used by engineers to mean the disassembling of a
product or device in order to understand the underlying
concepts and perhaps produce something similar.10 As
used with respect to jury instructions, the term means
deconstructing the desired verdict with respect to what
decisions the jury will have to make in order to reach that
desired verdict. In order to carry our reverse engineering of
jury instructions, a litigator must complete three steps
beyond establishing a theory of the case. The litigator must
(1) create a decision structure for the case, (2) identify
crucial points in that decision structure, and then (3)
incorporate the crucial points of that decision structure into
the jury instructions.11 The technique at its best makes use
of insights from discourse theory as well as knowledge of
the ways in which syntactic and semantic
structure operate
12
to assist or impede communication.
Recent case theory research has focused on case
theory as being grounded in story or narrative. 13 This
approach has moved away from case theory as legal
doctrine and towards case theory as persuasive storytelling.
Overall, however, it has been suggested that "[c]ase theory
operates at three levels: legal, factual, and persuasive[:]"
[1.] Legal theory defines the case in terms that
describe why, as a matter of law, your client
should prevail. . . . Because legal theory is
0

See generally

ELDAD EILAM, REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE

ENGINEERING (Wiley 2005).

" See Bocchino, Anthony J, and Samuel H. Solomon. What Juries
Want to Hear: Methods for Developing Persuasive Case Theory, 67

Tenn. L. Rev. 543 (2000).
12 See id
13 See generally Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9

CLINICAL L.

REV. 293, 295 (2002) (discussing techniques for treating the case
theory development as building a story line.
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primarily for judicial consumption, it is possible to
have two or more-perhaps even wholly
inconsistent-legal theories of the case at the
same time ....

All that must occur at trial is that

the lawyers prove facts sufficient to sustain a
favorable verdict on appeal."
[2.] Factual theory defines what the facts of the
case really are. .

.

.

[I]n developing effective

factual theory, it is vital to remember that not only
are the facts themselves important, but so is the
perception of facts that will drive factual theory.
Often the reality of the facts and the common
perception of them will be at odds, and it is for the
lawyer to reconcile reality and the perception of
reality for effective factual persuasion. ...
[3.] Persuasive theory

. . .

explains why it is that

the jury should feel right about its decision.
Persuasive theory is grounded in common human
experience and is usually presented in common
sense terms that come from some authoritative
source [for instance, the Bible or great literature]..
. . Persuasive theory will usually strike at the core

psychological values that most jurors share and
that motivate much of their decision-making. As
such, an effective persuasive theory will resonate
with themes of fairness, redressing a wrong, doing
the right thing, and, in circumstances suggesting
14
egregious behavior, the need for punishment.
It is important to treat a factual theory as a working
hypothesis, one that must be modified or discarded if
necessary supporting facts do not emerge during discovery.
Ideally, "the legal, factual, and persuasive theories of the
14

Bocchino & Solomon, supra note 5, at 544-46.
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case will be unitary." 15 Perhaps some specific case
In United States v. Hill,
examples will be helpful.
accused of conspiring to
were
County
defendants in Union
import cocaine based upon four and one-half hours of
audio-recorded conversation among defendants and
undercover agents. 16 Most of the facts were not at issue,
and the law was not in dispute. There was clearly a plan to
import cocaine into the county via air, which is a criminal
act. What was at issue was whose plan it was and whether
is, at issue was the proper
a conspiracy had occurred. That
7
interpretation of agreed facts.
The prosecution's theory was that the defendants
had conspired to import cocaine in violation of criminal
law.' 8 The defense's theory was that defendants, one of
whom was a county sheriff running for re-election (the
other was a mayor of a town within the same county), were
cooperating with initiating undercover agents in order to
confiscate the airplane when it landed with the cocaine.
Tennessee law permits local jurisdictions to keep such
equipment if it is confiscated during a drug seizure. The
defendants claimed that they needed the money that they
19
would raise by selling the airplane for county expenses.
Conversational analysis of the tape-recorded conversation
revealed a striking similarity of conversational patterns
between defendants and agents with respect to topic
initiation and topic elaboration. 20 Based on my analysis, I
concluded that the linguistic evidence supported the
defendants' theory at least as well as a criminal conspiracy
theory.

15Id. at 548.
16 United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1984).
17 Expert Report of Bethany K. Dumas, United States v. Hill, No. 835587/83-5588 (E.D. Tenn. argued May 20, 1985).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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This case was a re-trial of a case in which an
original conviction had been overturned by the Sixth
Circuit on the ground that the defendants' constitutional
rights had been violated when the original judge refused to
allow defense attorneys to question prospective jurors
about some of their beliefs. 21 A plea bargain was reached
in the second trial, but only after the jury was unable to
agree on a verdict. 22 Jurors did not appear to be confused
about the law and few facts were in dispute; however,
jurors were unable to agree on an interpretation of the
undisputed facts.23
In a number of capital cases, jurors have requested
clarifying instructions on the meaning of the term
reasonable doubt, used in the pattern instructions on
murder in most jurisdictions. 24 As recently as 2000, in
Weeks v. Angelone,25 the Supreme Court held:
[I]t is adequate for a trial judge to answer a jury's
question about the meaning of instructions by
reiterating the language of the original
instructions. The specific issue in Weeks was
whether a trial judge is obligated by the
Constitution to do more than refer the jury to a
specific portion of jury instructions when the jury
has a question about the meaning of an instruction.
Typically, trial judges respond to such questions
by simply re-reading the relevant portion of the
instructions. During the penalty phase of Weeks,
the jury questioned the trial judge concerning
21
22
23

24

Hill, 738 F.2d at 153.
Expert Opinion of Bethany K. Dumas, supranote 17.
id.

Bethany K. Dumas, Reasonable Doubt about Reasonable Doubt:

Assessing Jury Instruction Adequacy in a CapitalCase, in LANGUAGE
INTHE LEGAL PROCEss 246-49 (Janet Cotterill ed., Palgrave Macmillan
Press 2002).
25 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
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sentencing alternatives. The judge conferred with
Weeks's counsel, but concluded that he could not
answer their question more clearly, so he merely
referred the jury to the appropriate section of the
original jury instructions. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and that
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
final opinion thus declares it to be the law of the
are presumed to understand
land that "jurors
26
instructions."
For our purposes, the opinion from Weeks is
important because it makes clear that juries are sometimes
uncertain about the law. Additionally, it underscores that
jury understanding matters; it is sometimes a matter of life
and death.
Now that we have established the role and
importance of jury interpretation and jury comprehension,
let us explore the additional steps we are looking at today.
We will begin with a very brief look at how one transforms
a theory of the case into a decision structure.
The concept of reverse engineering of litigation
procedures was, to the best of my knowledge, first
introduced by Anthony Bocchino, James Dobson, and
Samuel Solomon in 2001.
They introduced "reverse
engineering the verdict" as:
[A] method for taking what has been learned in
discovery and molding and shaping that
information into a trial theory or strategy that will
ultimately persuade the jury of the correctness of
the position of our clients. .

.

. Some graphic

designers work well with large display boards,
Bethany K. Dumas, Jury Trials: Lay Jurors, Pattern Jury
Instructions, and Comprehension Issues, 67 TENN. L. REV. 701, 714
(2000) (internal citations omitted).
26
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while others are better suited to using computergenerated slide shows.... In this way the social
scientist can determine the effect certain
arguments have on the flow of juror opinion....
Usually, regarding the use of graphic displays, less
is better, and the graphic display professionals are
more likely to come to a similar conclusion as
they are part and parcel of the entire trial theory
development, not just their own special piece of
that preparation. . . . It is for the trial team to
determine not only the form, but also the content
of the graphic displays to be used
to best explain
27
and demonstrate the trial theory.
The strategy of "reverse engineering the verdict"
involves developing a detailed case theory and calling the
28
attention of jurors to discrete issues in the case theory.
Bocchino et al. acknowledge that "[i]n many cases, there is
little dispute as to what happened and who did what to
whom, but a great deal of dispute as to why the parties did
what they did .... At issue then, will be the motive of the
people who caused the thing to occur., 29 The authors then
suggest that:
[a] decision tree, which shows the options for
decisions and the choices made by the party in
charge, leading to the ultimate conclusion in the
case [can] be very helpful in advancing either the
plaintiffs or defendant's case. If the jury can be
made to understand the options available at each
juncture in critical decision making, the choices
27

Anthony J. Bocchino et al., What Juries ? Want to Hear H: Reverse

Engineering the Verdict, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 177, 177, 179, 182, 186,
189 (2001).
28 Id.
29

See id at 187.
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made, and the reasons why the choices were made,
jurors will be a long way towards understanding
whether the defendant's motives were legitimate or
not.30
In their 2001 article, Bocchino, Dobson, and
Solomon describe a detailed plan for using social scientists,
graphic designers, and lawyers to improve litigation
strategies. 3 1 The social scientists include those who
conduct various kinds of surveys, jury consultants, focus
groups, jury simulations, and witness evaluations. Missing
from the list are linguists who might pay attention to ways
in which the words of jury instructions might be introduced
during trial process in order to habituate jurors to thinking
in terms of key concepts that are crucial to legal theory as
well as factual analysis.
For example, suppose that in a products liability
case it is required that a product is shown to be "defective
and unreasonably dangerous." Pattern jury instructions do
not generally give narrative examples of what constitutes a
"defective and unreasonably dangerous" product (though
some judges do). However, a line of questioning of
witnesses could be developed and utilized that would
provide examples during trial so that when jury instructions
and closing arguments are given, jurors would already be
familiar with the terminology.
In other words, I am proposing that reverse
engineering of jury instructions be conducted as an exercise
in the explicit teaching vocabulary and definitions during
trial process. Reverse engineering of jury instructions
would need to be done within the context of legal, factual,
and persuasive theory, of course. There is no reason to
believe that this strategy would not work and every reason
to believe that it would. It has been demonstrated in the
30 Id.
31

See id. at 178-80.
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context of custodial interrogation that individuals being
interrogated can be "taught" to use specialized terms (often
with legal meanings that they do not understand). If one
has an explicit agenda and a clear sense of what one is
trying to teach, it should be relatively easy to teach terms
and definitions in the context of trial questioning.
Earlier, I mentioned the charge conference, where
the attorneys present their suggestions for jury instructions
and judges attempt to assemble those suggestions into a
cohesive document. At its best, a charge conference
concludes with judges presenting printed copies of the jury
instructions that will be used. Lawyers seeking reverse
engineering of jury instruction will have clear ideas about
what to present well before the charge conference is
actually held. How much of the legal definition that is
included will vary, depending upon the extent to which a
jurisdiction favors the lecture approach of jury instructions
or the Kentucky approach.
This article has proposed that techniques of reverse
engineering can be used to advantage in composing jury
instructions; partly by identifying how best to instruct
jurors about legal concepts and technical terms well before
they hear jury instructions or closing arguments. Future
publications will illustrate how appropriate questioning
during voir dire can serve to educate potential jurors about
terms and definitions. They will also explain how such
litigation techniques can make it easier for jurisdictions to
adopt the Kentucky approach or something similar,
dropping most legal definitions from jury instructions and
leaving it to the trial lawyers to educate jurors about
relevant concepts during trial. The overall goal of the
approach is to improve the clarity of instructions to achieve
litigation goals.

13
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